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[rh]―Making Moves‖ in the CCU 
[ab]Ethnographers of clinical rationality often assume that the goal of biomedical practice is 
to eliminate uncertainty to produce definitive diagnoses. In this ethnography of an academic 
cardiac intensive care unit (CCU) in the United States, bodies are conceived instead as ever-
changing constellations of problems that make diagnostic certainty irrelevant and require 
clinicians to construct and reconstruct temporary models to facilitate action. They suspend 
their uncertainty to ―convince themselves‖ enough to ―make moves‖ on patients, driven by 
the relentless tempo of critical illness. This necessitates a practice-oriented model of 
professional rationality that can account for the flow of time, with implications beyond the 










[h1]Making Moves in the CCU 
―Time to make a move,‖ said Dr. Moroz, nervously.
1
 ―We‘ve got a good story for heart failure … let‘s 
pick a tack and see how it goes.‖ We were standing in a patient‘s room in the cardiac intensive care 
unit (CCU) of an academic hospital in Boston, Massachusetts, where I was completing my medical 
residency in the early 2010s. Dr. Moroz was the CCU fellow, whose role was to ensure that I made 
appropriate patient care decisions. During residency, I had been gathering ethnographic data for a 
study on medical decision-making, and Dr. Moroz‘s guidance provided an excellent view of it. Next 
to us, in a hospital bed, lay Mr. Rizzo,
2
 an unconscious 72-year-old man in hemodynamic shock. 
The room surrounding us was full of equipment displaying streams of data. There was a 
monitor with tracings from an arterial blood pressure catheter and continuous cardiac telemetry. There 
was a second monitor with tracings from a pulmonary ―wedge‖ catheter—an intravenous line 
threaded through a vein in Mr. Rizzo‘s neck, down through the right side of his heart, ―wedged‖ into 
the blood vessels of his lungs, measuring pressures on both sides of his heart. Next to us was a table 
with a large grid of additional parameters: ventilator settings, arterial blood gases, IV infusion rates, 
urine output rates. Our data-rich environment had temporarily precipitated what Dr. Moroz referred to 
as ―a good story for heart failure.‖ But that story might change soon, thus we needed to ―pick a tack‖ 
and ―make a move.‖ These phrases, which seem glib, actually flagged an underlying existential terror, 
as we were acutely aware of Mr. Rizzo‘s place at the edge of a death that we were desperately trying 
to prevent. 
Dr. Moroz‘s statements encapsulated a form of professional rationality that I had observed in 
the CCU. He was thinking narratively (putting together a ―good story‖), but not in the common sense 
of making meaning out events (Mattingly 1998). Instead, he was assembling temporary models of 
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assumption in medical epistemology holds that the goal of biomedical practice is to place patients into 
stable disease categories that facilitate decision-making. Renée Fox‘s classic ethnographies of medical 
practice identified physicians‘ quest to diagnose stable disease entities and intervene to fix them, even 
if this knowledge was always incomplete, resulting in clinicians training to be constantly disappointed 
(Fox 1957). Or as Latour famously claimed, albeit in the very different context of lab research: 
―Science has two faces: one that knows and one that doesn‘t know yet‖ (Latour 1988, 7).  
But in my academic medical residency in Boston, I had noticed that the physicians around me 
rarely cared much about what they knew about patients‘ bodies. Of course, we knew an enormous 
amount about disease models and practice algorithms, but we spent little of our time debating these 
and more of our time trying to choose our next steps. I rarely thought: ―I know what is wrong with 
this patient.‖ Instead, I almost always thought: ―I know a good next thing to do.‖ For colleagues who I 
interviewed, it was the same. 
In this article, I ask a phenomenological question about expert rationality: What is in the mind 
of a clinician as she or he makes a therapeutic decision, particularly in the flow of (urgent) time? The 
answer is a portrait of a form of decision-making that may apply in a variety of settings, from Wall 
Street day traders, to air traffic control, to chess players.  
A first step in modeling this rationality is to abandon terms that obscure time. One such 
culprit is the word ―knowledge,‖ which is often assumed to be what I term phenomenologically 
viscous—something held like a substance: moldable, craft-able, breakable, erode-able, owned by 
individuals, and slow to change. In contrast, Dr. Moroz‘s knowledge was rapid and always already 
temporary. There are many possible conceptual sources for making sense of this kind of knowing. 
One is science studies, ranging from Latour‘s illustration of the contingent, unstable, social process 
leading up to the collective decision that a representation is good enough to (at least temporarily) not 
question it further, a process he called ―black-boxing‖ (Latour 1999); to Annemarie Mol‘s illustration 
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responses) into a coherent disease category, in her case ―atherosclerosis‖ (Mol 2002). One could also 
draw on pragmatic philosophy. John Dewey, for example, wrote about knowledge not as something 
acquired, but made in the flow of time: ―Conceptions, systems of conceptions, ends-in-view and plans 
are constantly making and remaking, as fast as those already in use reveal their weaknesses, defects 
and positive values‖ (Dewey 1929, 133é–34). Or one could use practice theory. Elizabeth Cartwright, 
for example, in an ethnography of the use of electronic fetal heartrate monitoring in birthing 
decisions, argued that one can only describe medical practice by understanding the ―logic of the 
moment,‖ because ―practice is irreversible and non-synchronous‖ (Cartwright 1998).  
―It‘s time to make a move,‖ said Dr. Moroz, and at one point when I hesitated, he added: 
―Remember: no move is also a move. It‘s time, let‘s do something.‖ Our enemy was inaction—above 
all else, we needed to avoid paralysis, which would allow Mr. Rizzo to die. 
As a tool for understanding the experience of this relationship to time, I draw on the concept 
of a ―suspension‖ or a ―pause‖ of uncertainty: a temporary choice to act despite the ongoing fact of 
not being sure. To explore this phenomenological moment, others have drawn on Samuel Coleridge‘s 
concept of ―suspension of disbelief‖ (Coleridge 1985), originally meant to describe how readers 
temporarily overcome doubt about what they encounter in fiction. The concept has been repurposed 
by Molé Liston and Karlin to demonstrate how practicing professionals ―provisionally ratify 
particular notions, ideas, subjects, creatures, and places and, in doing so, become capable of further 
engagement‖[(Molé Liston et al. 2013)). The term ―belief,‖ like ―knowledge,‖ risks a kind of 
phenomenological viscosity, and religious studies scholars have sought to convert it into a verb of 
action just as science studies scholars have sought to do with knowledge (Favret-Saada 1977; Good 
1994; Kirsch 2004; Lindquist and Coleman 2008; Needham 1972). But Coleridge‘s suspension of 
disbelief was meant to avoid this pitfall, to indicate a precarious, provisional détente, maintained 
through constant effort. When viewers watch a play, for example, they engage in a constant 
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this engagement. For Dr. Moroz, it was not disbelief that was being suspended, it was uncertainty 
about bodily processes. Dr. Moroz needed to build a convincing enough story at each moment of Mr. 
Rizzo‘s care to make a move, to not be paralyzed in the face of life and death.  
Understanding this decision-making, with its relationship to time and action, to data and 
narrative, requires an ethnographic journey into the clinical space of the CCU, in this case in an urban 
American hospital in the mid-2010s. My goal in this portrait is to reveal an ideal type of expert 
rationality with implications for understanding expertise more broadly. 
[h1]Rhythm and Process Certainty 
Mr. Rizzo arrived in the CCU just after midnight. The intensities of the day had subsided: the edge of 
performativity for medical rounds, the flux of specialists, the timid appearance and disappearance of 
families who were made to feel like guests in doctors‘ territory rather than rightful occupants. By 
nightfall, the CCU developed an eerie calm, inhabited by the sounds of machines. Dr. Moroz and I 
had been passing the evening in a kind of terrified boredom, waiting for the energy to shift suddenly 
to a hurried rush to save lives. I had received Dr. Moroz‘s consent for my study and was taking 
occasional audio recordings of him whenever the conversation turned toward decision-making.  
Around midnight, we received a call from the emergency department that they would be 
sending us Mr. Rizzo. We would later learn more about him as a person: that he was a beloved father 
and grandfather, a retired engineer who had become involved first in labor organizing and then in 
local politics. But when admitting him to the CCU, these details were omitted by the emergency 
department. Mr. Rizzo arrived to us instead as a bundle of quantitative data, the minimum that we 
needed to help us keep him alive.  
Explaining these data requires a short detour into a pair of disease models that partly 
governed our decisions that night. Mr. Rizzo had had many recent admissions for heart failure. He had 
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to his heart muscle. That evening, he had been brought by family to the emergency department with a 
fever and a cough, and then his blood pressure had dropped. He had been started on medications to 
stimulate his heart to increase his blood pressure (―pressors‖). The challenge presented to the 
emergency physicians, and the reason for admitting Mr. Rizzo to the CCU, was to choose between 
two disease models to explain his low blood pressure: either poor heart function (heart failure) or 
infection (sepsis).  
These models run as follows. On one hand, when the heart pumps poorly (heart failure), the 
kidneys do not receive enough blood flow to make enough urine, fluid accumulates, and the heart 
becomes overloaded, pumping less effectively. This causes a vicious cycle. In response, the blood 
vessels in the periphery of the body contract to help increase blood pressure. The treatment for this 
situation is to give diuretics to help a patient urinate the excess fluid.  
On the other hand, if a patient‘s blood pressure is low because of a systemic infection 
(sepsis), the situation is opposite. In response to the infection, blood vessels in the periphery dilate 
abnormally, dropping the blood pressure. This low blood pressure is treated in the opposite way to a 
failing heart: by administering large quantities of intravenous fluid to ―fill the tank‖ of the dilated 
blood vessels. One also simultaneously administers antibiotics to resolve the underlying infection.  
Mr. Rizzo‘s body presented a diagnostic conundrum classic to CCU medicine: deciding 
between opposite mechanisms of low blood pressure. Since those mechanisms had opposite 
treatments, making the wrong choice could kill him. Moreover, his body presented a challenge one 
layer deeper, since he likely had both problems: He had a known weak heart, and his fever and cough 
were signs of systemic infection. The task was thus not to decide which of the two processes he had, 
but which was dominant.  
A physical exam was one way of getting a sense of this: If Mr. Rizzo‘s peripheral blood 
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limbs would be warm and red. But like many patients in Mr. Rizzo‘s situation, his physical exam was 
difficult to interpret. On the phone passing off the patient, the emergency medicine physician 
described Mr. Rizzo‘s physical exam as ―equivocal.‖ She had thus made one more diagnostic decision 
before sending him up to the CCU. She had asked the hospital‘s interventional cardiologist to place a 
pulmonary artery (PA) catheter, an IV line inserted into a large neck vein, threaded down through the 
right side of the heart and wedged into the blood vessels in the lung, to measure pressures on both 
sides of the heart and use them to calculate fluid dynamics parameters.  
For a time, PA catheters were very popular in CCUs. Then a study emerged showing that, 
despite providing a lot of information, they did not improve patient mortality (ESCAPE Investigators 
2005). Yet this hospital had nonetheless placed a PA catheter in Mr. Rizzo. While waiting for Mr. 
Rizzo to arrive to us from the catheter lab, I asked Dr. Moroz why this was. ―Many of us like PA 
catheters,‖ he said, 
They‘re user-dependent, so some of us feel like we‘re better at reading them than the 
docs in the research studies. Basically, it‘s nice to have more data to work with when 
you‘re not sure what kind of shock you‘re dealing with. It helps move things along. 
It‘s hard sometimes to trust your physical exam alone. 
In written form, this explanation sounds flippant, but in the context of the pending arrival of a 
patient spiraling into death, I could hear an edge of fear in Dr. Moroz‘s voice. For him, having more 
data meant that he could trust his decisions more, which would prevent falling into a paralysis that 
would certainly end in Mr. Rizzo‘s death.  
Dr. Moroz claimed that the device was ―user-dependent.‖ This dependence is based on the 
fact that PA catheters have to be advanced into and wedged in the pulmonary artery, creating a seal so 
that the pressure on the two sides of the catheter can be measured. But it is unclear when this wedge 
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based on the shape of the pressure waves on the catheter monitor. The pressure numbers are then fed 
into two different equations, each based on a different set of assumptions about human physiology. 
Errors in the input numbers get amplified in the output, as do any mismatches between patient 
physiology and the physiology assumed by the equations. As a result, the two equations often produce 
contradicting portraits of the patient‘s condition. And these, in turn, may contradict what is seen on 
physical exam. The result is a cloud of data, full of shades of grey, which requires interpretation.  
Dr. Moroz explained: 
Usually, between the three pieces of data [physical exam plus two different quantitative PA 
outputs], you can convince yourself of a tie-breaker. You have to decide something, because 
no decision is also a decision. Eventually, the patient‘s physiology will declare itself and 
you‘ll figure it out. But now, you have to pick a course. 
―It will declare itself …?‖ I prompted.  
At this point, Mr. Rizzo hadn‘t yet arrived at the unit, and we had time for some fieldwork, so 
Dr. Moroz humored me, though we were both talking nervously and quickly. He explained: ―The 
problem will either get better, and we‘ll assume in retrospect that we got it right. Or it‘ll get worse, 
and we‘ll switch tacks, and then we‘ll wait and see again.‖ 
Then Mr. Rizzo arrived, connected to monitors, catheters, cuffs, IVs, and an endotracheal 
tube with a mechanical ventilator. As soon as he arrived, we grabbed his body, and Dr. Moroz called 
out to him that we were there to try to save his life. This touchstone to his physical body also doubled 
as our first piece of data: His skin was neither clearly hot nor cold, providing no clues about his 
physiology. We were then thrust into streams of data from the various instruments attached to his 
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There are many possible resources for making sense of time, ranging from the analytic 
philosophy of the nature of time itself (Heidegger 2008; McTaggart 1908), to the relationship between 
social forms and the rhythms of daily living (Bourdieu 1972; Certeau 2011; Dewey 1929; Lefebvre 
2004). But for clarity, I draw on two terms from music (Klemp et al. 2008) and practice theory 
(Bourdieu 1972; Cartwright 1998). The first is tempo, the subjective speed of time‘s flow. The second 
is rhythm, the sequential and related timing of events within that flow. A piece of music can be played 
with a slow or fast tempo without changing the rhythmic relationship between notes.  
As soon as Mr. Rizzo arrived, time‘s tempo in the room accelerated, determined by Mr. 
Rizzo‘s place at the edge of death and by our need to act to stave off that death. And in the midst of 
this tempo, there were rhythms all around us. There were physiologic processes within Mr. Rizzo‘s 
body: largely inscrutable, winding him toward destruction. There were data, some continuous like his 
pulse oximeter giving second-by-second readings of arterial oxygen concentrations, and others 
periodic, like his blood pressure cuff firing automatically, filling, measuring, and then reporting a 
result every 15 minutes on a screen. There was the frequency with which Mr. Rizzo‘s nurse or Dr. 
Moroz or I activated the PA catheter and then made a reading or performed parts of the physical 
exam.  
The moves that we made occurred in rhythm, with times-of-effect and durations-of-action. If 
we chose to give diuretics to help offload Mr. Rizzo‘s body of fluid, there would be an interval from 
ordering the medication to giving the medication, and then an immediate effect (offloading the lungs 
of fluid), followed by a slower effect (removing fluid from the circulatory system significantly in the 
first hour, then decreasingly over six hours). And so every moment standing by Mr. Rizzo‘s bedside 
was different from the prior moment and from the imagined next moment: a combination of bodily 
changes, streams of data, and interventions.  
Because of this flow of time, Dr. Moroz was not engaged in a process of trying to diagnose 
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to provide a window into some imagined truth, was already a matter of history. But the device was 
still useful. This was because it helped us ―convince ourselves one way or another‖ so that we could 
―make a move.‖ We were engaged in suspending uncertainty rather than doing away with it, using the 
instrument to help us temporarily set aside just enough of our doubt about what to do next, to launch 
ourselves out of paralysis and into action.  
For John Dewey, learning was not the acquisition of knowledge but something that one does 
(Dewey 1929). Nate Klemp likened Dewey‘s take on this process to jazz, where actors in situations 
must ―organize activities in time, at a particular time, often at just the right time, and always with a 
simultaneous concern for both the future and the past‖ (Klemp et al. 2008). For Klemp, ―art, 
education, ethics, and logic—topics all too easy to treat statically—are ongoing temporal 
achievements,‖ for which ―movement, direction and rhythm are essential resources for anyone 
figuring out what to do next‖ (pp. 4–5). For jazz musicians, a piece of information in the present 
moment (such as a surprising or mistakenly played note) must be carried forward and rewritten into a 
new context as new information comes to light. A jazz musician can play later notes to make earlier 
notes make more sense. In the same way, Dr. Moroz explained that ―the problem will either get better, 
and we‘ll assume in retrospect that we got it right. Or it will get worse, and we‘ll switch tacks, and 
then we‘ll wait and see again.‖ Just as the only thing a musician cannot do is stop, for Dr. Moroz, no 
decision was a decision to let Mr. Rizzo die. The flow of time, with its inevitable path toward death, 
was the ultimate taskmaster.  
This is not to say that we lacked certainty. In fact, the result of suspending uncertainty about 
Mr. Rizzo‘s physiology, even if it was not knowing what was wrong with him, was what might be 
called process certainty: getting ourselves to confidence about a good next thing to do. As one of my 
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In medicine, you never really know anything. All you need is: (1) a plausible 
diagnosis; and (2) a logical plan for the next step, whether diagnostic or therapeutic. 
Then, you pick a time frame to reevaluate, and repeat steps (1) and (2). Are you ever 
―right?‖ Not exactly. But the patient gets better, and then you move on. 
This process, an ongoing reevaluation and suspension of uncertainty, moves things forward. 
Whatever certainty we experienced was made, not had. As soon as we had made it, we acted. And 
then the always already changing situation forced us to embark again on the process of making just 
enough certainty to make the next move.  
[h1]How to Suspend Uncertainty: Data Richness and Rhythm 
If Latour famously claimed that ―science has two faces: one that knows and one that doesn‘t 
know yet‖ (Latour 1988, 7), we might add that, during our night in the CCU, a third face emerged: 
one that would never know, that did not in fact aim to know, but aimed instead to act. Annemarie Mol 
has provided tools for thinking about this ―shift from asking how sciences represent to asking how 
they intervene‖ (Mol 2002), by treating representation as part of practice. In her study of the nature of 
atherosclerosis in a Dutch hospital, Mol illustrated the processes by which different objects (patient 
symptoms, ultrasound images, blood pressure measurements, tissue samples under a microscope) 
were made to assemble into a coherent disease category. In situations when objects seemed to clash—
e.g., when symptoms and ultrasound findings provided contradictory representations—the drive to 
treat often determined which representation prevailed. Mol strategically chose atherosclerosis for her 
study because it was a stable and unquestioned disease entity, so she could illustrate how even 
seemingly closed representational categories require constant coordination in practice.  
Our night in the CCU involved a form of decision-making even more skewed from 
representation toward action. Mr. Rizzo‘s dying body was changing so quickly that our goal could not 
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how the CCU (of that night) compares to other sites within the hospital. To begin with, one might say 
that many other places within clinical practice function in a Latourian fashion, with what he called a 
quest to ―black-box‖ representations (Latour 1988), in this case used out of Latour‘s original context 
of lab sciences, converted instead to clinical practice, where a diagnosis itself might be considered a 
type of black box linked to an individual patient (Sanz 2016). During my time rotating on oncology 
wards, for example, oncologists would repeat a pedagogical refrain to one another that ―tissue is the 
issue,‖ meaning that all practice decisions hinge on obtaining a tissue sample to send to the pathology 
lab for definitive diagnosis, as well as a subsequent quest to stage the cancer using a set of scans. 
Although categories themselves are constantly being redefined (e.g., as new cell surface markers are 
discovered, or new trial data show different responses of cancer subtypes to particular chemotherapy 
regimens), at any given moment in oncology practice the goal seems to be definitive representation. 
Ethnographers have shown many contexts in which oncologists are unable to follow this map, in 
which they need to improvise, but this has usually been formulated as the fault of material or 
logistical circumstances, not a different kind of rationality (Livingston 2012; Mukherjee 2016; Sanz 
2016; Street 2011).  
If the ethnographer were to follow the oncologist‘s tissue sample into the pathologist‘s 
laboratory, it would quickly become clear that the pathologist‘s process for determining diagnosis is 
full of its own uncertainty and contingency. But even there, at the end of looking at a set of slides and 
running a set of molecular surface marker tests, the pathologist writes a report, forcing the diagnosis 
into a definitive category to hand back to the oncologists (Sanz 2016). The same is true to some 
degree in radiology, though there is much more dialogue between radiologists and oncologists before 
the cancer stage is determined (Saunders 2008).  
But in the CCU that night, we could not think like oncologists—we could not assume that our 
patient had a single species of disease that must be ascertained to deploy an algorithm. Mr. Rizzo‘s 
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now. If we can stay ahead of the eight ball overnight, we might be able to pull him out of it.‖ He 
didn‘t say, ―If we can figure out what Mr. Rizzo really has, once and for all, we can make the 
definitive move and cure his disease.‖ We were not in the business of knowing, we were in the 
business of staying ahead, of forecasting, playing at probabilities, and ultimately acting in response as 
much to the effects of our own decisions as the disease in Mr. Rizzo‘s body. We were existing in what 
Simimian-Darash and Rabinow would call a ―mode of uncertainty‖ (Samimian-Darash and Rabinow 
2015), managing uncertainty in the flow of time. Most importantly, our great enemy was inaction, 
which would lead to death. So we did what it took to suspend our uncertainty so that we could act.  
According to Dr. Moroz, an important component of avoiding paralysis was ―to have more 
data to work with,‖ to have a data-rich environment. Even if the PA catheter didn‘t provide us with a 
definitive representation of a disease process, Dr. Moroz felt that the data richness generated by the 
device made him more confident moving forward with a decision.  
This is not to say that such shades of grey pervaded every aspect of our mental constructs. In 
fact, in Mr. Rizzo‘s case, one could say that the disease categories of heart failure and sepsis 
themselves (that I explained above as though I take them as unquestioned truths) were vitally 
important unquestioned categories facilitating process certainty. The same was true for our 
understanding of cardiac physiology itself. Even though our physiology equations‘ assumptions failed 
to match Mr. Rizzo‘s body, and our many sources of data gave contradictory results, it never once 
crossed Dr. Moroz‘s mind to question whether those models themselves were correct. When I 
suggested this to Dr. Moroz at a later moment after things had calmed down with Mr. Rizzo‘s care, he 
laughed at the absurdity, and said: ―You really want to question all of cardiac physiology, here in the 
middle of the night? Sounds like a way to get nothing done and let the patient die.‖ Introducing grey 
into the disease categories themselves would have led to total paralysis and was thus dismissed as 
absurd. But having some uncertainty and flexibility built into the PA catheter was helpful to us, just as 
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[h1]―Building a Case‖ and the Nature of Real-time Data 
I ran my explanation of Mr. Rizzo‘s case by an anthropologist friend, who responded: ―What if this 
logic of suspension is just a feature of the PA catheter, because it produces particularly fuzzy 
knowledge? Aren‘t other forms of data much more certain?‖ This is particularly important to address, 
since PA catheters themselves have fallen so fully out of favor in most U.S. CCUs by the time I wrote 
this article that it may no longer be possible to witness the ethnographic moment I describe.  
Addressing this requires a journey into the moment when a clinical decision is made, amid the 
simultaneous flows of urgency and always-partial information that form the reality of medical 
epistemology. One such moment occurred when I was on the night watch as our hospital‘s senior 
consult physician, which involved floating around to help care for the sickest or most confusing 
patients on ordinary hospital floors (i.e., not yet needing the intensive care unit), providing an extra 
set of ideas for the clinicians trying to solve precarious problems. I received a page from a medical 
resident, Dr. Balanchuk, asking: ―Can I run a patient by you?‖  
I took a few moments to read about the patient in the chart. Her name was Ms. Stanger, and 
she had come to a nearby hospital with difficulty breathing. On arrival to their emergency department, 
she was found to have low oxygen in her blood, and placed on a special high-flow oxygen mask, 
partly because the chart mentioned that on one occasion she had expressed not wanting to be 
intubated or go to the intensive care unit, though she had never ratified that wish into a formal 
document. She was 71 years old, and had had cancer many years before, for which she had received 
chemotherapy that had damaged her heart, so that she now had very poor heart pump function, 
leading to heart failure.
3
 She also had a history of abnormal rhythms in her heart (atrial fibrillation and 
a poorly defined supraventricular tachycardia). From her physical exam and history, the emergency 
physicians at the nearby hospital decided that she was likely in heart failure, so they gave her diuretics 
to offload fluid from her heart. They then transferred her to our hospital, since that was where she 
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When I arrived to help, Dr. Balanchuk was outside Ms. Stanger‘s room at a computer with a 
pile of papers next to him, presumably the records from the other hospital. I immediately went into 
Ms. Stanger‘s room. She was somnolent and confused, struggling to breathe despite her high-flow 
oxygen. I held her hand for a moment and introduced myself. To my touch, she was neither hot nor 
cold. Her blood pressure was reasonable (110/65), but her heart rate was shockingly high, in the 170s 
(a normal maximum heart rate for her age should have been 150, meaning that her heart was working 
dangerously hard). I listened to her lungs, which sounded normal and dry, but her neck veins were 
distended with extra fluid, so it was difficult to say whether she was fluid overloaded. 
I went back outside and asked Dr. Balanchuk, ―Where are you in your thinking?‖ At the time, 
my mind was churning through possibilities and I wanted to make a decision quickly. The fastest way 
to accomplish this was for him to tell me exactly what he already knew and had already thought. I 
realized that my question to Dr. Balanchuk would spur him into talking about rhythm and tempo in 
decision-making, to summarize his thinking at an exact moment in time in the midst of a (continuous, 
punctuated) stream of ever-updating data and interventions. I had recruited him to my study on 
medical decision-making several months before, so he was not surprised when I turned on my audio 
recorder and instructed him not to mention identifiable patient information while we talked. After this 
brief moment, we ignored the recorder, shifting into saving Ms. Stanger‘s life as our only agenda. 
―The thing I‘m most worried about,‖ he said, ―is her heart rate. It‘s so high, she can‘t survive 
like this for long. The problem is,‖ he said, showing me her electrocardiogram (EKG), ―that her heart 
rate is too fast, so I can‘t tell from her EKG whether she is in sinus tach [a normal fast heart rate]‖ 
I interrupted him to clarify his thinking: ―meaning that she‘s septic [systemically infected].‖ 
A systemic infection can drop the blood pressure, and the heart may then speed up to compensate and 
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―Right,‖ he continued, ―and she needs her heart rate to maintain her blood pressure. Or, she 
might be in an SVT [an abnormal rapid rhythm], and her bad heart doesn‘t like the fast rate, and so 
she‘s in cardiogenic shock from the heart rate.‖ 
So, either her heart rate was the problem, going abnormally fast and potentially killing her; or 
there was another problem, an infection, and the fast heart was keeping her alive. 
―What else do you have going for each theory?‖ I asked. 
He said:  
Well, she‘s neither cold nor hot on exam, so that doesn‘t help. Her lungs sound dry 
but her neck veins are up, so that doesn‘t help. Her chest X-ray has a mucky left 
lower lobe [i.e., possible pneumonia], so that goes for infection, not heart failure. But 
her ABG [arterial blood gas] doesn‘t look infected,
5
 and she‘s super hypoxic, so those 
both go for heart failure. On her labs, she has a leukocytosis, which goes for 
infection, but she has an elevated BNP [brain naturietic peptide] and transaminases 
[liver function tests], which go for heart failure. Her lactate level is pending. So I 
can‘t decide. … I really want her lactate [a sign of systemic infection]—that would 
tip the balance for me.  
One need not understand the technical details of this monologue to note that Dr. Balanchuk, 
in trying to decide what to do for Ms. Stanger, was thinking with a table in his mind, weighing pieces 
of data on each side of a balance sheet. If I had made him write out this table, it might have looked 
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Piece of Data Distributive (Infection) Cardiogenic (Arrhythmia) 
Physical Exam equivocal equivocal 
Electrocardiogram equivocal equivocal 
Chest X-ray x  
Arterial Blood Gas  x 
Basic Labs equivocal equivocal 
Lactic Acid (Lactate) Level pending pending 
 
The purpose of his balance sheet was to try to ―tip the balance,‖ a heuristic for which he was 
very desperate, not because he would then know definitively what was wrong with her, but because it 
would allow him to make an initial move. He needed to suspend his uncertainty enough to act. Once 
he acted, he could see the results of his initial move, and then readjust based on those results.  
So why not just pick a tack at random and move forward? Because the stakes of the initial 
move were very high. At the time, I named this aloud:  
Just to be clear, if she‘s in cardiogenic shock from an abnormal rhythm, we want to 
break her rhythm and slow her [heart rate] down. If we don‘t, her failure will get 
worse, and we‘ll have to intubate her, and she could stop defending her blood 
pressure and crash fast. But if we‘re wrong, and she‘s septic [infected] and needs her 
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―Exactly,‖ said Dr. Balanchuk. ―I just can‘t put her together enough to build a case and move 
forward one way or another. I really want that lactate, to have something to go on to make a move.‖ 
―How long until the lactate comes back?‖ I asked. 
―I called the lab to make sure they‘re running it STAT,‖ he said. ―Probably ten or fifteen 
minutes.‖ 
We sat in silence for a moment, each trying to decide if Ms. Stanger would live for the 
minutes it would take for us to get these extra data. While we deliberated, I paged the head of the 
CCU to let her know we had a patient who needed to be there right away. Dr. Balanchuk phoned Ms. 
Stanger‘s family, which he had already done twice, but there was no answer. We briefly considered 
other ways to make the equivocal pieces of data in our table ―pick a side,‖ including the possibility of 
using a medication to briefly stop the heart, a dramatic measure that can unmask abnormal rhythms, 
though difficult to execute on short notice and in an unstable patient.  
At that point, the nurse came out of the room and interrupted us to say, ―her BP [blood 
pressure] is 90/50 … she‘s hard to arouse now.‖ This was a clear deterioration, and we needed to act 
quickly. 
I turned to Dr. Balanchuk: ―Decision time: What‘s your vote?‖ 
―I vote we give amio [amiodarone, a medication that can break arrhythmias],‖ he said. ―It 
could break the rhythm if it‘s an SVT and won‘t lower her heart rate too much.‖ He paused, thinking. 
―What‘s your vote?‖ 
―I vote for fluids,‖ I said. ―If she‘s septic and we don‘t give them, she‘ll die. If we‘re wrong, 
we can always intubate her, and she‘s headed to the CCU anyway.‖ 
He paused for a moment. ―Let‘s try amio,‖ he said, ―it‘s kind of a soft move, plus I ran it by 
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[not wanting to be intubated] at some point, so I‘m reluctant to commit her to that. Amio will buy us 
time to wait for the lactate.‖ He paused. ―I just need a story [to go on] before I launch full bore one 
way or another.‖ 
I nodded support for him to go with his plan rather than mine, and he wrote the order and told 
the nurse, who already had the amiodarone by the bedside. 
For the purposes of this article, I will forego describing what came next, though there were 
scenes of vivid intensity and emotion: the drop in Ms. Stanger‘s blood pressure; her intubation and 
transfer to the CCU; the CCU‘s decision to pick sepsis as a running diagnosis (i.e., opposite the tack 
we had taken) based on the return of a high lactate level; the CCU intern finally reaching Ms. 
Stanger‘s family, who were already on their way to the hospital; her family standing at her bedside, 
present for what they would later call a ―sad but peaceful end,‖ each member holding one of her 
limbs, weeping, unwavering in their conviction that she would not have wanted to be intubated if she 
were this critically ill, holding their vigil as her endotracheal tube was removed and her breathing 
stopped. 
Instead, I will set those scenes aside to stay with Dr. Balanchuk, paused in his moment of 
decision. Like in the CCU before, it was a moment in the flow of a terrifying tempo, punctuated by a 
furious cascade of rhythms, of data hastily assembled, of a disease process changing faster than it 
could be apprehended. And it was a moment dominated by the pending threat of death, ―at the edge‖ 
as Dr. Moroz had described it. What was in Dr. Balanchuk‘s mind in this moment, as he was poised to 
make a decision? Take, for a moment, the array of data he had before him. No individual piece of data 
would be considered particularly ―fuzzy,‖ as my anthropologist friend suggested. The labs and scans 
in Dr. Balanchuk‘s balance sheet were each of high fidelity, with narrow margins of error, each very 
tightly black-boxed by the world of clinical laboratory science. But their interpretation was manifold 
based on context, and as an aggregate, they formed a purely grey cloud of possibility. And was Dr. 
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like ―building a case,‖ and ―having a story to go on,‖ and ―tipping the balance‖ enough to be able to 
―make an initial move,‖ to achieve process certainty. Dr. Balanchuk was on a quest for something to 
help him suspend his uncertainty, to make him confident enough to act. When he was in too-much-
uncertainty, before his balance sheet had tipped one way or another, he was paralyzed.  
And Ms. Stanger‘s situation never became known. Dr. Balanchuk never said, ―If I just had the 
lactate level, I would know she was septic.‖ The next day, I received an e-mail from him updating me 
on Ms. Stanger‘s course after she moved to the CCU. ―The CCU decided to pursue the sepsis tack,‖ 
he wrote, ―but she crashed quickly and passed with her family by her side.‖ Even with the lactate 
level, the CCU‘s action was still just ―pursuing a tack.‖  
Dr. Balanchuk and I had a subsequent e-mail dialogue, but it was not about learning what she 
―really had,‖ it was simply going over the data that had been available to us at the time, and whether 
there was anything we should have considered based on that information. Ms. Stanger did not have an 
autopsy after death, but even such ―gold standard‖ data are generated through a highly subjective 
process, and though they are reported conclusively, they are mutable based on the clinical situation 
described by the clinicians caring for the patient. Discussion among clinicians almost always 
addresses whether appropriate action was taken, given the data on hand at the moment of decision. 
Elizabeth Cartwright, in an ethnography of the use of fetal monitors in medicalized birthing decisions, 
drew on Michael Jackson‘s work on divination to understand a similar phenomenon: ―the benefits 
derived from divination are so great at the time of divination that their ultimate ―truth‖ is rarely called 
into question‖ (Cartwright 1998, 250). 
It is worth noting the contents of our communication with Ms. Stanger and her family 
throughout this process. When the CCU team finally reached her family on the phone, they updated 
them on her situation. Several days later, I asked the CCU intern what she had said, and she 
summarized: ―Your mother has an infection, and her weak heart is struggling to keep up with it. We 
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here as soon as you can because it is very precarious.‖ What would have been the utility of sharing 
with Ms. Stanger‘s family the uncertainty inherent in Dr. Balanchuk‘s balance sheet? Or the fact that 
her life hung in the balance of a few decisions made in the heat of the moment? When I had updated 
Mr. Rizzo‘s family about his progress shortly after his arrival at the CCU, I had used similar phrasing, 
even though the two clinical situations hinged on very different pieces of data. Perhaps the notion that 
clinical medicine is based on a quest for black-boxing, for knowing what patients have is something 
that clinicians communicate to patients and families, rather than a dominant feature of the true nature 
of medical decision-making, just as Favret-Saada showed in her work on witchcraft in France, where 
belief and knowledge may be categories used to communicate and define worth across social worlds, 
rather than internally to those making decisions (Favret-Saada 1977). Internal to doctors in the middle 
of the night, the currency was certainly action rather than knowledge. 
[h1]Suspension and Epistemic Uncertainty 
These scenes from the CCU reveal an ideal type of medical rationality in which practitioners suspend 
their uncertainty to keep up with the rhythms of the body. Alongside Molé Liston and Karlin (Molé 
Liston et al. 2013), I have come to draw on Samuel Coleridge‘s concept of suspension of disbelief 
(Coleridge 1985) as a useful way of making sense of this, of modeling action-in-rhythm, for 
understanding how individuals like Dr. Balanchuk and Dr. Moroz make moves in clinical practice.  
Reworking the suspension of disbelief to make sense for medical epistemology requires a few 
adjustments. Coleridge‘s concept was invented for literary analysis, and thus tied inevitably to 
aesthetics and the consumption of art. As such, the key mechanistic force in Coleridge‘s conception—
the force connecting the mind and the outside world—was the imagination, and the thing that needed 
suspending was disbelief. In this article, I have replaced the notion of disbelief with the concept of 
uncertainty, more relevant to the CCU. But is it nonsense to talk about the role of imagination in 
medical decision-making? Following Molé Liston and Karlin, I envision Coleridge‘s term as 
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imagine the outside world), but also how they ―make reality,‖ turning ideas into material action. In 
this way, imagination is a creative force. This is precisely what Dr. Balanchuk and Dr. Moroz needed: 
concepts and pieces of information that could build a case, to ―have a story to go on,‖ and to ―tip the 
balance‖ enough to act (i.e., to effect a reality in the world). In some ways, the ideas necessary for the 
flow of their medical practice were less like Coleridge‘s concept of symbols, whose purpose was only 
pleasure, and more like Lévi-Strauss‘s, for whom above all else symbols were ―effective.‖ For Lévi-
Strauss, moving ideas around, putting symbols in a particular configuration, had the potential to create 
a particular material reality, a healing both of body and mind (Kleinman 1973; Lévi-Strauss 1974; 
Moerman 1979). This is a similar bridge between ideas and reality that one might find in discussions 
of the placebo effect (Ostenfeld-Rosenthal 2012), except that in this case the placebo is for the 
physician. The material (laboratory measurements of bodies, components of physical exam) is made 
immaterial (a grey cloud of data), which is then made material again in the form of physicians‘ 
interventions on the body. And reality can only be made by ideas that are relevant at the present 
moment in the rhythmic flow of time. This calls to mind Gaymon Bennett‘s work on the types of 
rationality that get deployed in contexts of uncertainty, which he names ―systems that calculate the 
future as that which can always be otherwise,‖ arguing that ―the value of calculation lies in its endless 
flexibility. If such calculations turn out to be wrong, they will still be right: the future is uncertain, 
after all‖ (Bennett 2015, 126). Only flexible tools are useful in the present for predicting and acting in 
anticipation of an ever-changing future. 
Coleridge‘s concept is useful for thinking through another aspect of medical epistemology 
that appears in the moments recounted above: Dr. Balanchuk‘s balance sheet. As Molé Liston and 
Karlin have pointed out, suspension provides ―a way to make two seemingly antithetical propositions 
acceptable at the same time.‖ Thus, unlike diagnosis, which would require Dr. Balanchuk to act only 
once he knew which side of his balance sheet was true, he was instead able to act in the present 
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true as the one he had (temporarily) selected. Saler has advocated reimagining ―suspension of 
disbelief‖ as part of the ―ironic imagination,‖ which promises a way to experience wonders and 
marvels while avoiding enchantment‘s potential to beguile (Saler 2004). In the context of medical 
practice, one could think of this ―ironic imagination‖ as allowing Dr. Balanchuk to allow his balance 
sheet to tip in one direction, without ultimately letting go of the other side. Physicians talk about the 
vital necessity of avoiding the trap of ―diagnostic anchoring‖ (i.e., of believing one‘s own or someone 
else‘s prior diagnosis too strongly, and thus failing to rewrite the story as new information comes 
available).  
The physician acts ―as if‖ one model is true, but this acting ―as if‖ is an act of creation, of 
making reality, because the patient‘s body changes as a result of interventions chosen. If the patient‘s 
body ―talks back‖ in a contrary way, then the physician switches and acts ―as if‖ the opposite concept 
is true. Eventually, the patient‘s problem is resolved—Mr. Rizzo‘s physical body is changed (i.e., he 
gets better) such that neither theory in the balance sheet is needed anymore—and the matter is 
dropped. 
Finally, Molé Liston and Karlin have argued that we are currently living in an era of 
―epistemic uncertainty.‖ This is as true in medicine as it is anywhere. The 1990s and early 2000s were 
characterized by an enthusiastic medical culture of evidence-based medicine, an ultra-modern hope 
that empirical data would find the ultimate truth to every question. This has been followed by a slow 
deterioration in trust in the ability of evidence to provide either unbiased truths (Ioannidis 2005; 
Petryna 2005; Prasad et al. 2011) or, in my experience, to inform real on-the-ground medical 
decisions, which are always fraught with particular details that trump the generalities of research 
studies. Just as in politics (Parmar 2012), I have seen young medical practitioners begin to swing 
away from unquestioned reliance on data, and to return to instinct and clinical experience. The types 
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is like to make decisions in such an era, where data, despite being post-modernized, are far from 
irrelevant.  
This exploration of tempo and rhythm in high-stakes medical decisions is meant to be an 
invitation to think more broadly about the phenomenology of expert rationality in many 
environments. Given that medical decisions in this U.S. CCU draw on a data-rich environment to 
resolve paralysis, what is the relationship to data in other life-and-death contexts? What occurs in the 
mind of a military officer facing a split-second decision about a drone strike, a similarly terrifying and 
ethically fraught existential moment? The same questions may have relevance for less mortal contexts 
as well. For example, how do Wall Street traders make second-by-second decisions amid the flow of 
massive quantities and varieties of available data? What is required for understanding these contexts 
is a move from studying rationality as a form of representation to one of practice, where expert 
knowledge is not something possessed but something done in the flow of irreversible time. 
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1. All names in this article are pseudonyms.  
2. In addition to pseudonyms, all patients in this article have been de-identified through 
altered demographic information. Moreover, the clinical scenarios presented in this article 
are extremely common, and thus not traceable to individual patients. 
3. In many ways, this background situation was similar to Mr. Rizzo‘s, though from a 
different cause. 
4. For simplicity of ethnography here, I am leaving out our brief discussion of many other 
causes of tachycardia and hypoxia, including myocardial infarction and pulmonary 
embolism, that we discounted based on certain data, though the argument about the 
‗fuzziness‘ of ‗building a case‘ that I discuss here also applies to that discussion. 
5. Her arterial blood gas showed that her blood was alkalotic from hyperventilation, rather 
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